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Abstract
We develop a static cooperative game-theoretic
framework for analyzing the impact of natural gas
storage on interconnected gas and electricity markets.
While increased utilization of gas storage has been
proposed as a policy solution to fuel-security concerns
in the electric power grid, the mode of interaction
between gas storage units and electric power markets
has not been investigated and some potential for
cross-market manipulation exists. We investigate the
potential for collusive behavior between gas storage
units and power plants, whereby joint profits in the
electricity and gas markets are increased by a strategy
that involves the cooperative agents taking a loss in
one market to the benefit of the other market. A
cooperative strategy increases joint profits in scenarios
when peak demand natural gas prices are high and the
power plant(s) involved in the cooperative arrangement
have relatively low marginal costs. The value of
cooperation is not affected by whether gas storage units
are physically connected to gas-fired power plants or
if gas storage units inject gas into existing pipeline
systems. While additional research into the nature of
these competitive effects is needed, particularly in a
repeated game context, our results point to the need
to carefully consider the competitive effects of fuel
security measures. A mechanism for monitoring of
interactions between gas storage and power plants is
likely warranted.

1.

Introduction

For economic and environmental reasons, the
utilization of natural gas in the electric power has been
increasing over the past decade in the United States
and elsewhere. While this fuel transition has brought
benefits in the form of lower emissions of greenhouse
gases and other pollutants, it has also brought a tighter
coupling between electricity and natural gas markets.
Since more than 30% of power generation in the
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Northeast U.S. is gas-fired, natural gas transmission in
this region is constrained when both residential and
power sector are at peak demand. The resulting impacts
on natural gas market prices and threats to the reliability
of the bulk power system have raised the profile of fuel
security as an important policy issue affecting both the
gas and electric transmission systems.
Recent work [1, 2, 3, 4] has focused on joint
evaluations of electricity and natural gas markets for
planning and market coordination purposes.
One
specific mechanism proposed for addressing fuel
security concerns is the use of on-site fuel storage at
natural gas power plants [1, 5, 6]. Such fuel storage
appears to be an economical way to mitigate some
fuel security concerns, but also tightens the coupling
between natural gas and electricity markets.
The present paper focuses on the potential
competitive effects of this inter-market coupling,
particularly the potential for natural gas storage to
be a strategic player in electricity markets. Our
game-theoretic approach is in line with previous
studies of vertical integration and strategic behavior
issues that have been conducted within the natural
gas sector [7, 8, 9] as well as related to electric
power systems [10, 11, 12, 13]. A major difference
with this analysis, however, is in the application to
cross-market integration and the use of a cooperative
game-theoretic framework [13, 14]. We build on
prior work [15, 16, 17] to model possible cooperation
strategies between natural gas storage asset and power
generation firms. These coalitions can impact the
behavior of natural gas suppliers, transmission system
operators, power generators, and electricity market
clearing.
In this paper, section 2 introduces a simple static
model of electricity and natural gas markets with
power generation technologies, gas storage operators
and power grid operators as types of players in the
game. Two markets are connected at this single node
with three power plants and one natural gas supplier.
Section 3 gives two examples. One is a simple numerical
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example helping understand the model. Another one is
en empirical example using empirical gas market data.
These examples illustrate more general conditions under
which we would expect coalition-forming between
gas storage and electric power supply to be jointly
profitable. Section 4 offers some thoughts on future
research directions and policy lessons.

2.

M CB = rB pg + cB

pdownstream = pupstream + t(q) + f (q..)

(1)

Here, pdownstream and pupstream denotes the natural
gas market zonal price for downstream zone and
upstream zone respectively. q is the amount transferred
from upstream zone to downstream zone. t(q) is
transmission cost, a fixed percentage of q. f (q)
is price difference function of downstream zone and
upstream zone. If q is smaller than transmission
capacity limitation between these two zones, f (q) =
0. Otherwise, f (q) is continuous monotone increasing
(for simplicity we assume that f (q) is linear. Also for
simplicity we assume pupstream zone = 0, and assume no
transmission cost.

(3)

• Player C: Power plant that uses a fuel other than
natural gas and has a constant marginal cost of C.
The significance of this assumption is discussed
further in Section 3.1.

Model Structure and Cooperative
Cases

Our modeling framework features an interconnected
natural gas and electricity market. The natural gas
market clears in a decentralized way while the electricity
market features centralized clearing via the usual
uniform-price auction. We assume that the natural gas
market has unlimited supply, but may have constraints
on transmission. Our natural gas system is divided into a
series of interconnected zones that obey the spatial price
arbitrage condition,

2.1.

• Player B: natural gas fired power plant with
generation capacity q̄B . Marginal cost:

• Player D: the only natural gas supplier in this
zone, assume has unlimited capacity and ready to
provide fuel to market. Assume player D has no
operation cost and the marginal fuel cost is p̃.
Here, rA , cA and rB , cB are heat rate efficiency
and fixed cost for player A and B respectively. Assume
Player A and B have same generation capacity. q̄A =
q̄B = q̄. Capacity limitation of player C is q̄C . Assume
player A is less efficient than player B: rA > rB . Thus,
the natural gas that used by player A and player B for
power generation are rA qA and rB qB .
Let q be the total amount of gas to be shipped into the
downstream zone via natural gas transmission system
before player D needs to supply gas to this zone. When
player D provides k amount of natural gas, the amount
of natural gas has to be transferred into this zone is q − k
(holding total zonal demand constant), yielding a market
price of f (q − k).
All the players want to maximize their own payoffs
in their relevant markets. Power plant profits are
determined by the difference between the clearing price
and the plant’s marginal cost. Player D wants to
optimize its natural gas supply amount k ∗ satisfying
equation (4) .

Players:

max pg k = max f (q − k)k
k

Our model features two natural gas power-plant
player types (with different heat rates and therefore
marginal costs), a non-gas power plant player type,
and a natural gas storage player. We do not explicitly
model the electricity market operator as a strategic
player. We assume one player of each type, but discuss
relaxing this assumption in Section 2. The natural
gas system is represented by a two-zone model, with
a production zone and consumption zone (where the
electricity market is located). We use pg indicate natural
gas market zonal price and pe for power generation
market clearing price in region.
• Player A: natural gas fired power plant with
generation capacity q̄A . Marginal cost:
M CA = rA pg + cA

(2)

(4)

k

Following Bushnell [12], we assume the natural gas
inverse demand function is an exponential function,
f (q) = exp(aq + b).

2.2.

Payoffs Under Different Cooperation
Scenarios

Here we describe the different potential modes
of cooperation between Player D and the electricity
market. We are concerned with the scenario when
natural gas spot market price pg is at high level, so we
can assume pg > C. We outline four different cases.

Case 0: No coalition If power sector demand of
natural gas is qN G,e , qN G,D is all other demand besides
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power sector, then total demand in zone is qN G,e +
qN G,D . If player D won’t provide any gas, all the gas
has to be transferred via the gas transmission system,
q = qN G,e + qN G,D . Let k 0 be the optimal supply
amount of player D that satisfies equation (4), and the
natural gas spot market price is p0g = f (q − k 0 ).
If p0g < C, there is no incentive for player D to
form a coalition with player A and/or player B. In this
case, player C is the marginal generator and player D
has no incentive to adjust the amount of natural gas that
it offers to the market (because players A and B are fully
dispatched).
If pg ≥ C, player A has higher marginal cost than
player B, then player A is the marginal generator. p0e =
0
M CA
. Dispatched power generation is {qA , q̄B , q̄C }.
Since we have inelastic power demand, and q̄A = q̄B =
q̄, let q̄ − qA = ∆, dispatched power generation can be
written as {q̄ − ∆, q̄, q̄C }. qe = 2q̄ − ∆ + q̄C . Thus,
Fuel used by player A and player B: {rA (q̄ − ∆), rB q̄}
(table 1).
The payoffs in the case where pg ≥ C would be:
0
πA
=0

(5)

0
0
πB
= (p0e − M CB
)q̄

(6)

0
0
πC
= (p0e − C)qC

(7)

0
πD
= (p0g − p̃)k 0

(8)

Case 1 Player A and D form coalition {A ∪ D} We
now turn to the case where Players A and D form a
coalition to increase joint profits in the electricity and
natural gas markets. In this and other cooperative cases,
we focus only on the joint profits and not the distribution
of profits between cooperative players. This would be
determined by the relative bargaining strength of the
players, which is a topic for further work and is not the
main focus of this analysis. We examine two physical
mechanisms for Player D to supply gas to Player A, and
then show that these physical mechanisms are equivalent
in terms of implications for joint profits.

the true marginal cost of Player A based on the market
price of gas). Then, player A won’t be the marginal
generator (figure (2)). This reduces the profits of Player
A but increases the profits of Player D, since overall gas
demand increases. These profits are shared with Player
A.

Figure 1. Player D can’t supply player A directly

Figure 2. Case 1 Electric marketing clearing

As the result, player B is the marginal generator.
1
p1e = M CB
.
Dispatched power generation:
{q̄A , qB , q̄C } = {q̄, q̄ − ∆, q̄C } (table 1). Fuel used by
player A and B: {rA q̄, rB (q̄ − ∆)}. k 1 is the optimal
releasing amount of player D in this case, that satisfying
equation (4). Natural gas market price is p1g = f (q−k 1 ).
1
Marginal cost of player A: M CA
= rA p1g + cA

(9)

1
Marginal cost of player B: M CB
= rB p1g + cB (10)

Player D cannot supply player A directly In this
case, Player D is not co-located with Player A but Player
D can supply Player A through a shared gas transmission
network. We model a cooperative agreement where
Player D buys gas at a low off-peak price and releases
it into the gas transmission system during an on-peak
period. During this period, Player D agrees to sell
gas directly to Player A at the off-peak rate. This
allows Player A to effectively under-bid in the electricity
market by submitting an offer lower than C (relative to

The payoffs in this case would be:
1
π{A∪D}
=

(p1g k 1 − p̃k 1 )
|
{z
}

profit on natural gas market

1
+ (p1e − M CA
)q̄
|
{z
}

profit on electricity market

1
1
= (p1g − p̃)k 1 + (M CB
− M CA
)q̄

(11)

1
πB
=0

(12)

1
1
πC
= (p1e − C)q̄C = (M CB
− C)q̄C

(13)
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Player D can supply player A directly In this
scenario, Players A and D are co-located. They may be
offtakers in the same location from the gas transmission
system, or Player D may be physically co-located with
Player A, as in on-site natural gas storage.

Since non-power plant natural gas demand qN G,d is
inelastic and rA > rB , we have total natural gas demand
0
0
1
1
qN
G = qN G,d + qN G,e < qN G,d + qN G,e = qN G (20)

p1g

As shown earlier, we would have k 0 ≤ k 1 and p0g ≤

1
To calculate V{A∪D} , we compare πG
, the increase
1
in gas market profits, with πP , the loss on power market
profits.
We assume when there is no any coalition formed
(case 0),
0
0
M CA
−  = M CB
=C

Figure 3. Player D can supply player A directly

Thus the marginal fuel cost of player A is p̃, the
fuel cost of player D. The impact of this physical
arrangement is that Player D can acquire natural gas at
a low price during the off-peak gas period, and supply
Player A during the on-peak gas period. This affects
the overall demand for gas in the gas consumption zone.
The payoff of this coalition is the same as if Players A
and D did not share any physical connection, as we show
below:
0

Marginal cost of player A: M C 1 A = rA p̃ + cA (14)
0

1
Marginal cost of player B: M C 1 B = rB p1g + cB = M CB
(15)

>0

(21)

Since p0g ≤ p1g and rA > rB ,
1
1
> M CB
≥C
M CA

(22)

.
Equality in (22) holds only when ∆ is not large
enough.  is a critical parameter here. It indicates
the relationship of marginal costs between player A, B
and C. In practice, this value should be straightforward
to calculate, so we can use it to derive a condition on
whether A ∪ D cooperation has any value.
We use the relationship in (22) to rewrite payoffs
as follows. For the purpose of this exposition, we
will assume a linear form for the inverse demand curve
pg = f (q) = aq + b. We note, however, that a similar
property holds in the case of an exponential inverse
demand curve.

0

1
π 1 {A∪D} = (p1g − p̃)(k 1 − rA qA
)
|
{z
}

• Case 0:

profit on natural gas market

+

(p1e
|

−

0
1
M C 1 A )qA

{z

}

profit on electricity market
1
=p1g k 1 − p̃k 1 − rA p1g q̄ + M CB
q̄ − cA q̄
1
=(p1g − p̃)k 1 + (M CB
− rA p1g q̄ − cA )q̄
1
1
=(p1g − p̃)k 1 + (M CB
− M CA
)q̄
0
=⇒ π{A∪D} = π{A∪D}

(16)
(17)

Value of coalition {A ∪ D} In case 0, power sector
consumption of natural gas is:
0
qN
G,e = rA (q̄ − ∆) + rB q̄

0
πA
=0

(23)

0
πB
= q̄B 

(24)

0
πC
=0

(25)

0
πD
= k 0 (p0g − p̃)

(26)

0
0
πA
+ πD
= k 0 (p0g − p̃)

(27)

1
1
0
πG
= πD
− πD

(28)

1
0
πP1 = πA
− πA

(29)

• Case 1:

(18)

In case 1, this consumption is:
1
0
qN
G,e = rA q̄+rB (q̄−∆) = qN G,e +(rA −rB )∆ (19)

Noting that for profit maximization we would have k ∗ =
aqN G +b
, and inserting the linear demand curve, we then
2a
have:

Page 3256

If V{A∪D} ≥ 0,
1 0
b
k 0 = (qN
G+ )
2
a
a 0
b
(q
+ )
2 NG a
b
1 0
k 1 = (qN
G + ∆(rA − rB ) + )
2
a
1
= k 0 + ∆(rA − rB )
2
0
0
p0g = a(qN
G−k )+b=

1
πG
+ πP1 ≥ 0

(30)
(31)

1
b
p̃
0
=⇒ a∆(rA − rB )(qN
− )
G+
2
a a
1
+ a∆2 (rA − rB )2 − q̄A ≥ 0
4
1

(32)

=⇒  ≤ 2

b
0
a∆(rA − rB )[qN
G+ a −
q̄A

1
1
M CA
= rA (p0g + a∆(rA + rB )) + cA
2
1
= (C + ) + a∆(rA + rB )
2
1
1
M CB
= rB (p0g + a∆(rA + rB )) + cB
2
1
= C + a∆rB (rA − rB )
2

=⇒ 0 <  ≤
(33)

(34)

b
p̃
1
∆(rA − rB ) + − ]
2
a a

(40)

Case 2: Player B and D form coalition {B ∪ D}
Since player B is more efficient than player A, the
coalition strategy defined for {A ∪ D} won’t change the
dispatch order relative to the case of no coalition. There
would thus be no gain for B or D to cooperate.

(35)

1
1
=( ∆(rA − rB ) + k 0 )(p0g + a∆(rA − rB )
2
2
− p̃) − k 0 (p0g − p̃)

(36)

1
1
πP1 =(M CB
− M CA
)q̄A

1
=[(C + a∆(rA − rB )rB ) − (C + 
2
1
+ a∆(rA − rB )rA )]q̄A
2
= − q̄A

1
a∆(rA − rB )[(qN G,D + q̄N G,e )−
2q̄A

Under assumption (21), when ∆ is too small or p̃ is
too great, there may be no value of  satisfying equation
(40). In that case, V{A∪D} ≤ 0 and neither player A or
D would have incentive for cooperation.

1
=⇒ πG
=k 1 (p1g − p̃) − k 0 (p0g − p̃)

1
b
p̃
0
− )
= a∆(rA − rB )(qN
G+
2
a a
1 2
+ a∆ (rA − rB )2
4

+ 12 ∆(rA − rB )]
(39)

1
1
p1g = a(qN
G−k )+b

1
0
0
= a(qN
G − k ) + b + a∆(rA − rB )
2
1
= p0g + a∆(rA − rB )
2

p̃
a

(38)

Case 3 Player A, B and D form coalition {A ∪ B ∪ D}
The final case that we consider is for Players A and B
to jointly form a coalition with Player D. The strategy
for this coalition would be similar to the {A ∪ D}
coalition - Players A and B would submit offers to
the power market operator below actual marginal costs.
This pushes Player C to the margin in the power market
(figure (4)). The extra profits in the natural gas market
would be shared between Players A, B and D.
3
The dispatch in this case is {q̄A , q̄B , qC
} =
0
{q̄A , q̄B , q̄C −∆} = {qA +∆, q̄B , q̄C −∆}. Total power
sector usage of natural gas is rA q̄A + rB q̄B . Natural
gas power plants in case 3 get dispatched at a higher
level than in case 0, by an amount ∆. Natural gas total
demand in region increases by rA ∆ compared to case 0
(table (1)), so we would have
3
0
qN
G = qN G + ∆rA

(37)

(41)

Thus, as we claimed before, optimal value k 3 >
k 1 > k 0 , p3g > p1g > p0g . Since the payoff of
coalition {A ∪ B ∪ D} is invariant to the physical
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{A ∪ D}.
1 0
b
1
0
k 3 = (qN
G + ∆rA + ) = k + ∆rA
2
a
2

(48)

3
3
p3g =a(qN
G−k )+b

1
0
0
=a(qN
G − k ) + b + a∆rA
2
1
=p0g + a∆rA
2

Figure 4. Case 3 Electric marketing clearing

interconnection mechanism between Player D and the
gas-fired generators (as we saw in case 1), we focus
on the scenario where player D injects gas into the
transmission system directly.
Generator marginal costs in this case are given by:
3
M CA
= rA p3g + cA

(42)

3
M CB
= rB p3g + cB

(43)

M CC = C

(44)

Since Player C is the marginal generator, we also
have p3e = C. The payoffs can be written as:
3
πC
=0

(45)

3
3
π{A∪B∪D} =(C − M CA
)q̄A + (C − M CB
)q̄B

+ (p3g − p̃)k 3

1
1
=⇒ k 3 (p3g − p̃) =( ∆rA + k 0 )(p0g + a∆rA − p̃)
2
2
1
=k 0 (p0g − p̃) + [ ∆rA (p0g − p̃)
2
1
1
2
+ a∆rA k 0 ]
(50)
+ a∆2 rA
4
2
To evaluate if there is extra value associated with
the coalition {A ∪ B ∪ D} as compared with case 0
(no coalition), we compare the increase in natural gas
market profits with the loss in power market profits.
Lost power market profits:
πP3 = −[q̄A + q̄A rA (p3g − p0g ) + q̄B rB (p3g − p0g ) + q̄B ]
(51)
Increased natural gas market profits:
3
πG
=

(46)

The payoff condition for the coalition can be
rewritten as:

∆
∆
∆2 2
rA (p0g − p̃) + arA k 0 +
ar
2
2
4 A

(52)

Substitute (30) (31) (48) and (49) into (51) and (52):
πP3 = −[

π{A∪B∪D} = [−q̄A − q̄A rA (p3g − p0g )]
|
{z
}
profits from A

3
πG
=

+ [−q̄B rB (p3g − p0g )]
|
{z
}

(49)

∆
arA (rA q̄A + rB q̄B ) + (q̄A + q̄B )] (53)
2
a
b
p̃
∆2 2
0
(∆rA )(qN
− )+
ar
G+
2
a a
4 A

(54)

profits from B

+ [k 3 (p3g − p̃)]
|
{z
}

(47)

profits from D

Here, k 3 satisfies maxk3 p3g k 3 .
Again, if we assume a linear inverse demand curve
for natural gas, we can derive an analogous condition on
 for the value of coalition {A ∪ B ∪ D} as we did for

We want V{A∪B∪D} ≥ 0, so we evaluate:
V{A∪B∪D} =πG + πP
a
b
p̃
0
= ∆rA (qN
− − rA q̄A − rB q̄B )
G+
2
a a
+

∆2 2
ar − (q̄A + q̄B ) ≥ 0
4 A

(55)
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a
p̃
b
0
∆rA (qN
− )
G+
2
a a
a
− ∆rA (rA q̄A + rB q̄B )
2
a
0
= ∆rA (qN
G − (rA q̄A + rB q̄B )
2
b
p̃
+ − )
a a
a
= ∆rA [(qN G,d + (q̄N G,e − rA ∆))
2
b
p̃
− q̄N G,e + − ]
a a
a
b
p̃
= ∆rA (qN G,d − rA ∆ + − )
2
a a
(56)

=⇒ (q̄A + q̄B ) ≤

=⇒  ≤

a
2 ∆rA (qN G,d

− rA ∆ +
q̄e

b
a

− ap̃ )
(57)

Here, qN G,d is all the natural gas demand except
power section demand. q̄e is the total capacity of all
natural gas fired power plants (player A and B). q̄N G,e
is the fuel usage when q̄e amount of power generation is
dispatched to natural gas fired generators. ∆ describes
how much more power natural gas fired power plants
can get via cooperating with player D.
Therefore, when , the marginal cost difference
with player A (the one with highest marginal cost in
coalition) and C, is smaller than the threshold derived
above, there is extra value for coalition.
When player C is the marginal generator in case 0,
0
0
∆ = 0, and V{A∪B∪D} = 0. When M CA
or M CB
>
C, marginal generator is natural gas fired power plant,
∆ > 0 and coalition {A ∪ B ∪ D} can have non-zero
value.
Table 1 summarizes the four cases that we have
considered for this cooperative static game.
A potentially interesting extension of this framework
would be to assume multiple actors in the market for
each player type. This extension is beyond the scope
of the present paper, but we provide some intuition as
to how the model’s results may be impacted for each of
the three cases if there are multiple actors of firm types
A and B. In case 1, suppose that only one of the type
A players forms a coalition with player D. Recall from
the discussion of case 1 that the driver of value for the
A ∪ D coalition is the increased profits in the natural gas
market. These profits will increase as more actors join
the coalition, and one actor of type A cannot free-ride
on another actor of type A. Thus, the Nash equilibrium
would be for all type A players to join the coalition.

A similar situation arises for case 3, where the Nash
equilibrium is for all actors of types A and B to join the
coalition (or for none to join the coalition, depending
on the values of the parameters in equation (57)). Since
there is no extra value for the coalition in case 2, we do
not need to consider this case any further.

3.

Illustrative Examples and Sensitivities

We illustrate our cooperative framework using some
realistic parameters from the natural gas market. Our
natural gas prices for the gas consumption zone are
based on Transco Zone 6 New York sub-zone data(
from Janunary 2012 to June 2014, access from SNL)
. We divide all natural gas fired power plants in
this region into two player types. Player A has
lower heat rate efficiency, with average heat rate 9.142
mmBT U/M W h. Player B has higher efficiency with
average heat rate 6.431 mmBT U/M W h.
Marginal costs for Players A and B are given below;
we continue to assume that Player C has constant
marginal cost C.
Player A: M CA = rA pg + cA = 9.142pg + 24 (58)
Player B: M CB = rB pg + cB = 6.431pg + 40 (59)
Based on EIA 2014 natural gas consumption data
[18], approximately 1/3 of natural gas consumption in
New York is used for electric power. We take 1/3 of
natural gas consumption in zone as the total capacity
of player A and B, and assume q̄A = q̄B . We assume
player D is a natural gas supplier in this region with
marginal cost p̃. The capacity of player D is unlimited.
If output from Player D is zero, then the prevailing spot
gas price is pg .
Figure 5 shows the value of the coalitions {A ∪ D}
and {A ∪ B ∪ D} as a function of the spot price of
natural gas (without any coalition) in the consumption
zone. When natural gas market price is high enough
that player A is the marginal generator, the value of
coalition {A ∪ D} is always positive, and increases with
the price of natural gas. As we showed earlier, positive
value of coalition {A ∪ B ∪ D} only exists in a small
range (equation (57)). Interestingly, at very high levels
of the natural gas price (greater than $ 22 per million
BTU) the value of coalition {A ∪ B ∪ D} becomes
negative while the value of coalition {A ∪ D} remain
high. The intuition here is that because Player B would
have been on the margin (at a high electricity market
price) in the absence of any cooperative behavior, the
profits of coalition {A ∪ B ∪ D} in natural gas market
can not cover the loss in the electricity market.
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Table 1. Case Comparison
case 0
Player
Marginal Cost
Marginal Generator
Dispatched Power Generation
Natural Gas Usage By Generator
In Region
Profit

A
B
rA p0A + cA
rB p0B + cB
X(as assumed)
qA
q̄B
rA q A
rB q̄B
0
qN
G = qN G,D + q̄N G,e − rA ∆
0
0
0
(M CA
− M CB
)q̄B

C
C

D
p̃

q̄C
−k0
0
(M CA
− C)q̄C

(p0g − p̃)k0

B
rB p1B + cB
X
qB
rB (q̄B − ∆)

C
C

D
p̃

0

1
(M CA
− C)q̄C

(p1g − p̃)k1

B
rB p2B + cB

C
C

D
p̃

q̄B
rB q̄B

q̄C

2
2
)q̄B
− M CB
(M CA

2
− C)q̄C
(M CA

(p2g − p̃)k2

A
rA p3A + cA

B
rB p3B + cB

D
p̃

q̄A
rA q̄A
0
qN
G + rA ∆
3
)q̄A
(C − M CA

q̄B
rB q̄B

C
C
X
q̄C

case 1
Player
Marginal Cost
Marginal Generator
Dispatched Power Generation
Natural Gas Usage By Generator
In Region
Profit

A
rA p1A + cA
q̄A
rA (qA + ∆)
0
qN
G + (rA + rB )∆
1
1
(M CB
− M CA
)q̄A

q̄C
−k1

case 2
Player
Marginal Cost
Marginal Generator
Dispatched Power Generation
Natural Gas Usage By Generator
In Region
Profit

A
rA p2A + cA
X
qA
rA q A
0
qN
G
0

−k2

case 3
Player
Marginal Cost
Marginal Generator
Dispatched Power Generation
Natural Gas Usage By Generator
In Region
Profit

3.1.

Sensitivity analysis

To better understand the drivers of the value of
coalitions {A ∪ D} and {A ∪ B ∪ D}, we perform
a sensitivity analysis of the coalition value on several
model parameters: (p̃, C and ∆
q̄ ). In each of these
simulations we vary one of these parameters and the
natural gas price, and observe how the value of the
coalitions {A ∪ D} and {A ∪ B ∪ D} change. These
sensitivity results are shown in Figures (6), (7) and (??).
In each plot, there are multiple panels. The number
on the top of each panel is the value of the sensitivity
parameter setup for that panel. In each panel in each
plot, the natural gas market price (without player D in
the market) is on the horizontal axis. The vertical axis
measures the value of the coalition. ”A+B+D” means
coalition {A ∪ B ∪ D}, and ”A+D” indicates coalition
{A ∪ D}. We note that the scale for the vertical axis is
not consistent between figures (but is consistent between
panels in a single figure).
Referring to Figure 6, we observe two behaviors of

0
)q̄B
(C − M CB

−k3
0

(p3g − p̃)k3

interest in the value of the {A ∪ D} coalition as p̃ goes
from 0 $/mmBTU to 5 $/mmBTU. First, overall the
value of the coalition declines as p̃ increases. Second,
the value of the natural gas price at which the value of
the coalition rises above zero decreases as p̃ increases,
although once for values of p̃ equal to $4 or $5 per
million BTU the value of {A∪D} varies very little from
zero. The value of {A∪B ∪D} is positive only for small
values of p̃ and at moderate gas prices.
The influence of C on the value of coalition is a
little bit different from p̃. In the first panel of figure
(7), C = 70 $/mmBTU, we observe that the value of
{A ∪ B ∪ D} exceeds the value of {A ∪ D} for some
lower gas price values. This is because of the behavior
of the marginal cost curves of the power plants. When pg
is low, the marginal generator is player C in the absence
of a coalition. As pg increases, the marginal costs of
player A and B are also increasing; in particular the
marginal cost of A increases faster than the marginal
cost of B as gas prices rise. For lower gas prices and
smaller values of C, Player B is on the margin and
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Figure 5. Value of Coalition

Figure 7. Value of coalition as C varies

coalition {A ∪ B ∪ D} has higher value. As the gas
price rises, Player A moves to the margin and coalition
{A ∪ D} has higher value. Higher values of C change
the range and magnitude of the amount by which the
{A ∪ B ∪ D} is more profitable.

cost is a simplifying assumption, though the implication
of this assumption depends on which case is considered.
In cases 1 and 2, if the marginal cost of player C is not
constant, the coalition between player D and player A
or B will not affect the dispatch point for player C. In
case 3, the optimal coalition strategy will depend on
how sensitive the marginal cost of player C is to the
fuel usage. Figure (8) and (7) illustrates the relationship
between the value of coalition {A ∪ B ∪ D} and the
marginal cost of player C when this marginal cost is
assumed constant. With non-constant marginal cost, the
domain of the profitable region for the coalition will
change.
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Figure 6. Value of coalition as p̃ varies

Figure 8. Value of coalition {A ∪ B ∪ D} for Natural
gas original market price and Marginal cost of player C

The assumption that player C has constant marginal
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4.

Conclusion

In a simple static cooperative game context, we find
the potential for collusive behavior between gas storage
units and gas-fired power plants operating in centralized
electricity markets. Joint gas-electric profits can be
increased in some circumstances through a strategy
of temporal price arbitrage in the natural gas market
and the manipulation of electric energy market prices
through under-bidding. Whether this strategy yields any
additional cross-market profits is highly sensitive to a
number of different market parameters, and therefore
collusive behavior will not have strategic value in all
states of the market. We find that the value of the
gas-grid coalition is particularly sensitive to the on-peak
price of natural gas and the marginal cost of generator(s)
participating in the coalition.
The present paper is limited to a static game context
in a stylized electricity market, and additional research
is needed to formulate specific policy prescriptions. The
value of the gas-grid coalition declines as the number
of participants grows, so monitoring and detection
activities should focus more on smaller coalitions than
larger coalitions. Importantly, we show that the potential
for collusive behavior is independent of the physical
mechanism of interconnection between the gas unit
and the gas-fired power plant. Prohibiting or limiting
vertical integration between gas storage and power
plants, for example through co-location of storage
with gas-fired plants, does not necessarily remove
the potential for collusive behavior. Our modeling
framework points towards the need for developing
cross-market monitoring mechanisms to ensure that
investments made to promote fuel security in electricity
markets do not have deleterious unintended competitive
consequences.
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